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ARGUMENTS
I.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE STATE'S CLAIMS, THE RECORD
DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED
IN
DETERMINING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE STOP DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
SEIZURE REQUIRING REASONABLE SUSPICION.

The State argues that
See

suspicion."

"the officers acted with reasonable

Brief of Appellee, pp. 16-22.

In conjunction

with its argument, the State claims that Ms. Hughes

"fails to

properly challenge the trial court's factual findings."
pp. 12-16.
preserve

Id.

at

Finally, the State contends that Ms. Hughes failed to

her

claim

that

she

was

seized

because

retained her "small little wooden mini bat". 1

Id.

the

officers

at pp. 15-16.

These arguments are without merit for the reasons set forth, in
turn, below.
A.

The Marshaling Requirement Does Not Apply
Because This Appeal
Involves
the
Trial
Court's Application of the Law to the Facts.

In the course of denying the Motion to Suppress, the trial
court ruled as follows:
My best view of this, counsel, is that this never
got beyond a level 1 encounter. It's clear from reading
the relevant case law that request for identification,
that doesn't constitute a show of authority, and by the
way I've read State of Utah vs. Mike O'Leary Dean and
also Salt Lake City vs. Carolyn L. Rae.
And they
discuss the difference between a level 1 and level 2 and
x

Deputy Butcher referred to it as being a "small little wooden
mini bat" in the course of his testimony elicited during the
evidentiary hearing on the matter (R. 171:29:13-24).
1

that's really the critical question here, in my mind at
least.
They discussed examples of circumstances that
mights indicate a level 2 or a seizure. It could be the
threatening presence of several officer[s], the display
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled.
I didn't se,e that in any of the
evidence before me. It's clear in that same case, in
the Salt Lake City case I mentioned, the court indicated
that request for identification alone as a matter of law
does not constitute a show of authority sufficient to
convert an innocent encounter into a seizure.
In my
view, this never got beyond level 1.
The search was
consistent - was pursuant to consent and I must deny the
motion.
See

R. 171:58-59.
The proper standard of review to be applied in the instant

case was clarified by the Utah Supreme Court not so long ago in
State

v. Brake,

2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699, where the Court stated

that the reviewing court is to apply a "non-deferential review" to
the "application of the law to the underlying factual findings in
search and seizure cases."
Layton

City

v. Oliver,

review

the

trial

Id.

at 1fl5, 103 P. 3d 699; see

2006 UT App 244, ^11, 139 P.3d 281

court's

ruling

on

a motion

to

suppress

also
("We
for

correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of
the law to the facts.")

(citing State

v. Brake,

2004 UT 95, i|l5,

103 P.3d 699).
In

the

instant

applying what

case,

it believed

the

trial

court,

to be the relevant

2

in

the

case

course

of

law to the

facts, concluded that "this never got beyond a level 1 encounter."
(R. 171:58:10-11).

Moreover, the trial court, itself, believed

this to be the "critical question"
this

case

involves

a

question

(R. 171:58:16-17).

concerning

the

trial

Because
court's

application of the law to the facts, the marshaling requirement,
as a matter of necessity, does not apply.
B.

Ms. Hughes Properly
Argument for Appeal.

Preserved

the

Seizure

"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court
State

may not be raised on appeal."
10 P.3d 346; see
543.

"The

also

'mere

State

v.

mention'

v. Holgate,

Cruz,

of

an

2000 UT 74, ^11,

2006 UT 45, %22,
issue

without

122 P.3d

introducing

supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve
that issue for appeal."

State v. Brown,

Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted).
is

based

on

the

policy

that,

856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah

This preservation requirement
"in

the

interest

of

orderly

procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to
address

a

claimed

error

and,

if

appropriate,

Holgate,

2000 UT 74 at fll (quotations omitted).

correct

it."

Consequently, an

objection "must at least be raised to a level of consciousness
such that the trial [court] can consider it."
361.

3

Brown,

856 P. 2d at

In the case at bar, appointed trial counsel explicitly raised
the seizure argument, which included the particular circumstance
of the officers retaining her "small little wooden mini bat", by
not only arguing such in the Memorandum in support of the Motion
to Suppress but by way of

the elicited

testimony

of

Butcher and Hawkins during the evidentiary hearing.

Deputies

See

R. 23,

Memorandum in Support of Motions to Suppress and to Dismiss; see
also

R.

171:29:8-24, R.

171:43-44.

Ms. Hughes' evidence

and

argument concerning the "small little wooden mini bat" was part
and parcel with her argument that she was seized for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment
force

or

show

of

"when the officer

authority

liberty'" of her person.

ha [d] in

State

v. Bean,

Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Mendenhall,
1876

(quoting Terry

1879 n.16

v. Ohio,

(1968)).

"'by means of physical
some

way

restrained

the

869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah

446 U.S. at 552, 100 S.Ct. at

392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868,

By virtue of such, the issue, at the very

least, was raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial
court could consider it.
P. 3d

590

(stating

detention, the court

that

See State
when

v. Warren,
determining

2003 UT 36, 1fl4,
the

validity

of

78

a

"must view the articulable facts in their

totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate
them in isolation."); see also

United

4

States

v.

Sokolow,

490 U.S.

1,

8

(1989)

(requiring

a

review

of

"the

totality

of

the

circumstances -- the whole picture").
C«

The Circumstances Surrounding the Stop by
Deputies Butcher and Hawkins Demonstrated a
Show of Authority Sufficient to Convert the
Stop from a Level One to a Level Two
Encounter.

There are three different levels of police-citizen encounters
under the Fourth Amendment

to the United States

Constitution,

which are as follows:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime . . .; (3) an officer may
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense had been committed or is
being committed.
State v. Markland,
State v. Johnson,
encounter

n

2005 UT 26, KlO n.l, 112 P. 3d 507
805 P.2d 761, 763

(Utah 1991)).

(quoting

A level one

'is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond

to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time.'"
Salt Lake
State
v.

City

v. Jackson,

Bean,

person

v. Ray,

2000 UT App 55, 111, 998 P.2d 274 (citing

805 P. 2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and

869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).

State

"As long as a

'remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,

there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy
as would under the Constitution require some particularized and

5

objective
United

Jackson,

justification.'"

States

v. Mendenhall,

805 3?. 2d at 767

(quoting

446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870,

1877 (1980)).
In contrast to the level one stop, the person, under a level
two stop, is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment "when the
officer

ux

by means of physical force or show of authority has in
Bean,

some way restrained the liberty'" of a person.
(quoting

Mendenhall,

(quoting Terry

v. Ohio,

986

n.16

(1968)).

stop and

u

a

446

U.S. at

552,

100

869 P.2d at

S. Ct.

at

1876

392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879

Thus, a level one encounter becomes a level two

seizure under the

fourth amendment

occurs when a

reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe
Jackson,

he or she is not free to leave."
occurs

"even

if

the

purpose

resulting detention brief."
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); see
(Utah Ct. App. 1988)

also

of
State

the

stop

v. Steward,

State

v.

(citing Delaware

653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395 (1979)).

8 05 P.2d at 767.
is

limited

the

806 P. 2d 213, 216

Sierra,
v.

and

This

Prouse,

ISA

P.2d 972, 975
440 U.S. 648,

Some examples of circumstances

indicating a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to
leave include " v the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be

6

compelled. '"

State

v. Patefield,

1996) (quoting Mendenhall,

927 P. 2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App.

446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. At 1877).

Arguably, Deputy Butcher's initial request for identification
alone did not constitute a level two stop.

However, any level one

encounter escalated to a level two stop during Deputy Butcher's
investigation.
Deputy Butcher initially confronted Ms. Hughes and her two
male companions by pulling his patrol vehicle near to where they
stood

on

the

side

of

the

road,

stepping

out

of

ordering them to come back, asking them, "[W]hat

his

car

and

[i]s going on"?

Deputy Butcher asked each of them for their age and identification
because they

"appeared

somewhat young" to him.

They provided

their names and dates of birth inasmuch as they did not have any
identification.

At

that point, Deputy Butcher

did not

run a

records check of the personal information but rather straightway
inquired whether they had any weapons without observing anything
that caused him to believe there were any weapons on them.2

Ms.

Hughes, upon Deputy Butcher's request, responded by retrieving "a
small

little

wooden

mini

bat"

from her

coat

sleeve.

Deputy

Butcher then began checking for weapons by performing a pat down
check of one of Ms. Hughes' male

2

companions, during which he

A period of "several minutes" transpired before running the
records check (R. 171:15-16).
7

located a knife.

During that pat down check, Deputy Butcher also

located some finger scales and what appeared to be marijuana.

He

then took the male companion into custody and called for backup.
When

the

second

uniformed

deputy

responded

in

another

patrol

vehicle, he approached Ms. Hughes and immediately asked her if she
had any weapons.

Ms. Hughes responded by informing him that she

had previously surrendered the mini wooden bat to Deputy Butcher.
Nevertheless, Deputy Hawkins said that he was going to pat her
down for weapons, to which she said "no.''
u

He then told her that

it wasn't going to be that thorough of a search."
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration,

a reasonable person in Ms. Hughes' position would not feel free to
just walk away by abandoning her property, let alone approaching
Deputy Butcher

to take back her property

and

leave.

Rather,

Deputy Butcher's accusatory tone of voice and language, retention
of

property,3

pat

down,

and

custody

of

her

male

companion

sufficiently restrained Mr. Hughes' freedom to the point that she
was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
"'[A] level two stop . . . must be supported by reasonable
suspicion

[or it] violates the Fourth Amendment

to the United

See Salt
Lake City
v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, fl4, 998 P.2d 274
(discussing how the retention of personal items coupled with other
factors create a show of official authority such that a reasonable
person would not believe he or she was free to leave).
8

States Constitution.'"4

Salt Lake

Kl8f 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State
Ct. App.

1994));

see

also

City

v. Bean,

v.

2005 UT App 55,

869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah

Utah Code Ann.

officer may stop any person

Ray,

in a public

§ 77-7-15

("A

peace

place when he has a

reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.").
Even though this standard is lower than the standard required for
probable

cause

circumstances

to

arrest,

approach

the

same

is utilized

totality

to determine

of
if

facts

and

there

are

sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable
suspicion.

Ray,

2005 UT App 55 at ^18 (citations omitted).

determining whether this objective

ux

In

standard has been met, the

focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer
Id.

immediately before the stop.'"

(quoting State

v.

Friesen,

1999 UT App 262, ^12, 988 P.2d 7 ) .
Due to the facts known to Deputies Butcher and Hawkins at the
time of the seizure, there was no reasonable articulable suspicion
supporting the seizure of Ms. Hughes.

4

The facts known to the

"When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative
detention." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^[23, 164 P. 3d 397 (citing
Florida
v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); United
States
v.
Carhee,
27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1994)).

9

Deputies were, at the very least, as consistent with lawful
behavior as with the commission of a crime.
testimony confirms such.

In fact, their

As a result, there exists no basis upon

which to justify the level two stop and seizure of Ms. Hughes,
which violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the
previously

filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Hughes

respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of her
motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its
opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \Q

10

da\rof November, 2008.
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